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How might we approach the non-representational background of thought and life? One 
claim  that  is  shared  across  non-representational  theories  is  that  the  background 
matters:  there exist  a series of affective,  embodied, conditions for representational 
acts and practices. The background is not an inert, natural, backdrop but a collectively 
lived  and  shaped  condition.  How,  then,  to  research  these  conditions  that  shape, 
without determining, representational life? And how might we learn to focus on the 
problems that researching such conditions poses to social analysis? In this chapter we 
address these questions by way of reflections on the methodological  challenges of 
researching one such collective condition: affective atmospheres. 
Within the social  sciences there is a burgeoning literature on the concept of 
atmosphere  (Adey  et  al.,  Forthcoming;  Anderson,  2009;  Ash,  2012,  2013;  Stewart 
2012). This literature emerges from, and seeks to develop, existing work on affect and 
affect  theory—itself  an  increasingly  prominent  series  of  theoretical  trajectories  for 
analysing  how  life  is  organised  outside  of  strictly  representational  registers  and 
structures of meaning. For nonrepresentational theory, a turn to affect has opened new 
ways for thinking the relationship between bodies and spaces in ways that attend to 
the often-taken-for-granted and implicit effects that encounters between human and 
non-human  bodies  can  generate.  While  earlier  literature  on  affect  focused  on  its 
individualised actualization as a particular emotional state in a human body, a turn to 
the  concept  of  affective  atmosphere  has  been  a  way  to  think  about  the  diffuse, 
collective nature of affective life. As Adey et al. put it:
Thinking about affective atmospheres also draws attention to how affects can be 
“collective” and be transmitted between people. Such atmospheres “form part of 
the ubiquitous backdrop of everyday life’’ but a backdrop that is at the same 
time ‘‘forceful and affect[s] the ways in which we inhabit…spaces (Bissell, 2010, 
p. 272) (Adey, Forthcoming, p, 3).
Atmospheres appear to exemplify a non-representational object of inquiry: they are 
part of the “ubiquitous backdrop” of life and thought, whilst at the same time exerting 
some kind of force.   
There  are,  though,  a  series  of  methodological  challenges  the  concept  of 
atmosphere poses. Adey et al. argue that in practice “there are conceptual limits to just 
how  the  field  is  being  rendered  as  a  site  of  affect  and  how  it  might  be 
researched”  (Adey  et  al.,  Forthcoming,  p.  2).  Indeed,  these  limits  are  linked  to 
theorisations of affect that are often predicated on the notion of the encounter, where 
affects emerge when two beings or entities contact one another in some way. This has 
resulted in various critiques that ask how affects can travel or how the same affect can 
be experienced by multiple bodies (Pile, 2009). In Seyfert’s words: “how can an affect 
be simultaneously defined as an effect that only emerges from the encounter between 
bodies and also as a force external to these bodies?’” (2012, p. 29).
The  problem  is  that  an  atmosphere  is  at  once  a  condition  and  is  itself 
conditioned.  How  is  it  possible  to  research  both  the  formation  of  an  affective 
atmosphere—that is, how it is conditioned—and what an atmosphere does—that is, 
how it conditions, or affects? The problem of understanding the non-representational 
background as conditioned and condition is not unique to the concept of affective 
atmospheres.  Far  from it.  An  emphasis  on  the  background is  shared  across  non-
representational theories, alongside an attentiveness to how meaning emerges from 
practical action and how events introduce the chance of something different into life. 
The  background  has  been  given  a  number  of  names,  such  as  milieu  or  context. 
However,  much in the same way that Bruno Latour (2005) critiques the concept of 
society,  notions  of  context  or  background  can  become  caught  up  in  a  logic  of 
explanation; either the background is explained away by reference to something else, 
or  it  is  used  to  explain.  What  non-representational  theories  do  in  relation  to  the 
background is break with this reductive logic of explanation. This means that non-
representational methods are part of styles of research and analysis that treat non-
representational  phenomena  as  at  once  conditioned  and  conditions.  Seemingly 
ephemeral, seemingly vague and diffuse, atmospheres nevertheless have effects and 
are  effects.  Non-representational  methods work to  intensify  the problems that  the 
background poses to social analysis and to sense and disclose how the background is 
composed and organised. 
The  chapter  is  organised  around  four  problematics  that  are  intensified  in 
relation to the concept of atmosphere but are shared by other non-representational 
phenomena. We discuss these problematics through empirical vignettes drawn from 
our  recent  experiences  of  waiting  in  NHS  (National  Health  Service)  hospitals  in 
Newcastle  Upon  Tyne  and  Gateshead,  UK.  First,  how  is  it  possible  to  name  an 
atmosphere, if naming is generally considered to be a representational act that fixes 
and therefore reduces a phenomenon? Particularly intense atmospheres such as mass 
panic or fear may be easy to identify, but it seems harder to analyse and differentiate 
between more everyday banal  or quotidian atmospheres,  that may in fact be more 
important to the ongoing maintenance of social life or the performance of power and 
politics.  Second,  how  is  it  possible  to  account  for  the  coexistence  of  non-
representational  conditions?  That  is  to  say,  can atmospheres  co-exist  in  the same 
space, or do they require separation and exteriority from one another in order to exist? 
Third, how might we become sensitive to the causal powers of phenomena that exert a 
force,  but  may  be  vague  and  diffuse,  ephemeral  and  indeterminate?  How  can  we 
account for or assign causality to an atmosphere in situations where atmospheres mix 
with  other  participants  and  are  themselves  multiple?  Fourth,  if  atmospheres  are 
ephemeral then what mechanisms or processes dictate an atmosphere’s capacity for 
change and how do these changes come about? How do we think about change in the 
background of thought and life without reproducing a model of linear succession? 
Identification  
A child sits and is soothed and sick is wiped away; a name is called by a receptionist, 
another a few minutes later; business as people arrive and leave, occasional glances at 
posters  quietly  documenting  mundane  safety  routines;  doors  off  to  somewhere, 
background chatter of  hushed voices;  what looks like a head wound; arms around 
shoulders, heads awkwardly resting against arms; one of us waits with the almost but 
not quite soothed child hoping she won’t be sick.
Perhaps we could name the atmosphere of the waiting room of a North-East 
A&E department as anxious waiting. Perhaps it, if an atmosphere is an “it,” is better 
named as  the  urgency  and expectancy  of  a  scene  of  emergency.  Perhaps  anxious 
waiting for the hope of treatment better evokes the atmosphere. Perhaps all of these 
names and none of them would serve to express,  reflect or enact the background 
affective quality of a room in which matters of life and death are never far away. 
Atmospheres are routinely and regularly individualised by being named. Naming 
is of course central to efforts to explicate atmospheres in order to render them subject 
to intervention. Naming is in this respect a pragmatic act. The name fixes an end point 
to be produced through some kind of intervention. It specifies what should be brought 
into being, and is usually part of familiar taxonomies of atmospheres. Naming is also a 
pragmatic way of giving an account of a situation or event. Names are ascribed to 
atmospheres in ways that enable, or not, joint recognition. But naming also occurs as 
part of all research into and with atmospheres. Here it poses more of a problem for any 
analysis influenced by non-representational approaches. For it would be easy to reduce 
naming to one particular function: fixing within a representational economy. On this 
understanding,  naming  would  freeze  what  is  in  process,  determine  what  is 
indeterminate. An atmosphere or a set of atmospheres would from then on be housed 
within the unity of a name. What would supposedly be lost is precisely atmosphere as a 
condition that exists ambiguously. 
Atmospheres appear to be a strange class of non-representational thing—what 
Galloway and Thacker (2007, p.  11) call  “the persistent naming of the entity-that-
cannot-be-named. What is obvious and immediate is the same thing that is shadowy 
and  unknown.”  The  problem  is,  then,  hardly  unique  to  atmospheres  but  crosses 
between various non-representational phenomena; the sense that not only do names 
miss their  referent but that  the division between representation and referent is  an 
effect  of  a  particular  version of  representation.  Even though atmospheres  are  also 
regularly  named  by  those  within  them or  have  just  exited  them,  there  would  be 
something suspect about naming, something that appeared to sit uneasily in a book 
on non-representational methods. 
Whilst there is much to be said for this account of naming, it risks reproducing a 
too one-dimensional account of the relation between researching atmospheres and 
representation.  In  particular,  it  risks  presuming  a  difference  in  kind  between  the 
representational  and  non-representational  and  reproducing  a  one-dimensional 
understanding  of  representation.  Let’s  return  to  our  hesitancy  in  naming  the 
atmospheres that coexisted within the waiting room to summarise some alternative 
representational practices and strategies. Proliferating names for atmospheres might 
be  one  way  of  responding  to  the  volatility  of  atmospheres,  or  their  ambiguous, 
indeterminate, status, by placing in question whether an atmosphere is a determinate 
thing with fixed properties and capacities. Another representational strategy might be 
to be cryptic about the name given to an atmosphere, attempting to acknowledge the 
tension  that  inheres  in  naming  the  background  of  life  and  thought  by  hinting  or 
through  misdirection.  Another  representational  strategy  is  to  invent  fabulous  new 
names for every atmosphere encountered, in doing so refusing to invoke any kind of 
universal  descriptor for an atmosphere.  Inventing a new name—names that do not 
allow for recognition, names that confuse, names that resonate—for every atmosphere 
would affirm the singularity of this or that atmosphere and its irreducibility. Here the 
name wouldn’t be pulled off the shelf and applied to a situation.  
But perhaps we get a different sense of the work naming does if we think about 
naming as part of a methodological practice involving a combination of description 
and  speculation.  A  practice  that  acknowledges  that  atmospheres  cannot  be  faced 
without a name, but treats naming as one act in a practice orientated to the emanation 
of an atmosphere. Naming an atmosphere is, first, recognition of the individuation of a 
particular  atmosphere  and  its  difference  from  other  atmospheres.  Naming 
presupposes, then, the existence of that which is named. It is one part of a process of 
ascribing an identity to an atmosphere that occurs alongside a research process that 
makes present the individuation of this or that atmosphere. Specifically, naming is an 
act within a practice of description that attunes to the composition of an atmosphere 
and the emanation of an atmosphere from some kind of ensemble. As a practice, it 
might be that many names are tried out for atmospheres before one fits the particular 
affective quality. In this respect, naming emerges, in part, from how the researcher is 
simultaneously  orientated  towards  an  atmosphere  and  dwells  within  that  same 
atmosphere. 
Identification  is  an  ongoing  process  that  involves  assembling  traces  of  an 
atmosphere from a multiplicity of bits and pieces. But, and second, naming is also an 
act that evokes something beyond the name and can hint towards how uncertainty 
inheres in the process of ascribing an identity to an atmosphere. We could say, first, 
that any name invokes the singularity and generality of any atmosphere. A name is 
singular in that it speaks to the specificity of how a particular atmosphere emanates. It 
gestures towards something that clearly and obviously exceeds the unity of a name. 
Naming is also general,  though. It  gestures towards commonalities and differences 
with  other  atmospheres.  It  invites  us  to  consider  that  something might  be  shared 
between the ensembles from which atmospheres emanate and in the way in which 
atmospheres condition. 
We  could  then  emphasise,  slightly  differently,  how  naming  acts  to  evoke 
something of the particularity of an atmosphere and how an atmosphere conditions. 
Perhaps,  certain  atmosphere  comes  to  attach  to  the  name  itself,  conjuring  other 
atmospheres.  Riley  (2005)  reminds  us  that  names  have  a  tone.  They  move.  By 
highlighting  the  role  of  naming  in  orientating  towards  the  individuation  of  an 
atmosphere we are trying to rescue naming from its devaluation as a representational 
act  somehow counter  to non-representational  methods.  Naming is  a  necessary act 
because, whether done cryptically, inventively or otherwise, by evoking atmosphere as 
one entity amongst others it provides a necessary starting point for any analysis: that 
atmospheres are real phenomena that are part of the conditions for life and thought, 
albeit strange phenomena whose existence is always in question.  
Co-existence
A group of people are sitting in a square waiting room, next to a series of doors 
leading to  a  variety  of  examination  and treatment  rooms.  Based in  the  optometry 
department, the room provides patients a space to sit after they have been booked into 
the hospital away from the general waiting area, but before they have been seen by a 
nurse or doctor. The patients are all there regarding some issue with their eyes. Each 
waits, not knowing the severity or banality of the medical problem the other patients 
(or perhaps themselves) may suffer from. Nor are they aware of the treatment that the 
other  patients  may  be  about  to  experience  behind  the  closed  doors  that  line  the 
waiting room’s walls. Some may be there for a routine eye test, others for a more 
invasive procedure and yet others looking to receive a diagnosis for some seemingly 
obscure ailment. This ambiguity over the medical status of each individual, alongside 
the fear, anticipation or calm that accompanies the knowledge, or lack thereof, of what 
will  happen in the examination or  treatment  room makes it  difficult  to  discern an 
overarching atmosphere that unites or pervades the various assembled bodies. Some 
patients appear relaxed, while others tense and nervous. Two older ladies chat about 
television soap operas and immigration, while a younger man looks at the ground and 
taps his feet. 
It  is  tempting  to  summarise  the  tone  or  feel  of  an  atmosphere  under  one 
overarching name such as fear or panic and assume that an atmosphere’s single feel or 
tone is  what  gives an atmosphere the capacity  to  dictate  or  dominate a  particular 
situation or environment. Such a strategy might suggest that the assemblage of bodies 
and  objects  that  constitute  the  waiting  room described  above  have  generated  an 
atmosphere of uncertainty or ambiguity. For example, while the older women appear 
relaxed and chatty other patients appear tense and uncomfortable. However, turning to 
this simple vignette again, it is possible to argue that the waiting room is constituted 
by multiple atmospheres that touch, contact and rub up against one another, rather 
than a single, overarching or dominant one. The two ladies chatting appeared at ease 
and the sound and gentle manner of their conversation about ostensibly public issues 
and  television  shows  touched  other  waiting  patients  and  drew  them  into  the 
conversation,  bolstering and amplifying an atmosphere of  calm conviviality.  At  the 
same moment, others sitting in the waiting room clearly did not want to be involved in 
this  conversation  and  turned  their  heads  towards  the  floor  or  away  from  the 
conservation to  avoid  being drawn into  the  mundane chatter.  These patients  were 
emanating  a  more  hesitant  or  fearful  comportment,  expressed  through their  body 
language and behaviour, such as sighing loudly and shifting from side to side in their 
seat. Rather than competing with one another, these forces and their associated affects 
(of hesitancy, calm and potential worry) existed alongside one another without direct 
collision or competition. In this example there was no clear relationship of dominance 
in which one atmosphere overrode or cancelled out the other. In other words, these 
multiple atmospheres seemingly contacted or touched one another, while remaining 
affectively discrete. For a nonrepresentational analysis of atmospheres to be effective, 
this requires understanding how to account for these forms of contact and touch. 
Graham Harman’s reading of Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of touch is useful in this 
regard. As Harman argues: 
to touch something is to make contact with it even when remaining separate 
from it  because the entities that touch do not fuse together.  To touch is to 
caress  a  surface  that  belongs  to  something  else,  but  never  to  master  or 
consume it. It requires a certain space between beings, but also an interface 
where they meet (Harman, 2012, p. 98). 
In relation to the examples discussed above, the atmospheres emanating from 
the various bodies and objects in the waiting room touched, but did not simply mix or 
fuse  together.  Rather,  they  existed  as  discrete  phenomena.  The  sound waves  and 
intonation of the voices of the ladies sitting in the waiting room may have affected the 
bodies of the more hesitant patients, causing them to shift or look away, but it did not 
override  the  atmosphere  of  hesitancy  they  exuded.  In  this  case  affects  that  can 
constitute  an  atmosphere  may  completely  miss  other  affects  that  could  cause  an 
atmosphere to change. Harman alludes to objects that “miss” or do not touch and 
affect one another, even when in the same environment through the simple example of 
a paper screen: 
We can bring to mind an oriental paper screen of the type that is used to divide 
fashionable rooms into sectors, filtering lamplight into a muted glow. Such a 
device offers a formidable barrier for the particles of dust that continually drift 
into it, or even gravel chips that might accidentally be kicked up against it. But 
the soft light passing through the room encounters it only as a partial obstacle 
(Harman, 2002, p. 31). 
Atmospheres  can  then  co-exist  alongside  one  another  without  fusing  or  melting 
together precisely because the objects and bodies that make up an atmosphere do not 
exist as a set of totally interactive or accessible relations (also see Ash, 2013). 
We  can  further  elucidate  how atmospheres  potentially  co-exist  in  the  same 
environment while still appearing distinct and separate, without necessarily affecting 
one another through Nancy’s distinction between the weight and mass of bodies. In 
Corpus, Nancy (2008) argues the weight of a body is what it exerts on other things, 
while the mass of a thing is the amount of matter it is composed of. Comparing weight 
and mass “Nancy contrasts the weight that bodies exert on other bodies with the mass 
through which they concentrate in themselves…here the weight of mutual relations 
takes clear precedence” (Harman, 2012, p. 100). For Nancy, a body or object is defined 
by its boundary and a boundary is determined by a relationship to something other 
than itself. In Harman’s reading, for Nancy, it is the mutual weighing of bodies that is 
primary to giving a thing its boundary (and thus defining it). However at the same time, 
a process of weighing is only possible because of a thing’s mass, which is singular and 
precedes  its  encounter  with  other  things.  The  thing’s  non-relational  mass  and  its 
relational weight are therefore intertwined, but it is the thing’s weight (rather than its 
mass) that emerges when contacting or touching with other things. 
Translating  this  into  our  language  of  atmospheres,  mass  refers  to  each 
individual object and body’s features or properties which give it a unique potential to 
affect, dependent on its relational configuration with other things. Weight refers to the 
affects that emerge from the selective relations between objects that actually occur 
within a given situation and thus form a specific atmosphere. In other words, bodies or 
objects  have a mass,  which shapes their  capacity  to affect,  but  do not  necessarily 
weigh upon one another. For example, a sound wave may not affect a concrete block 
and so be unable to contribute or shape the atmosphere associated with the concrete 
block, even if the sound wave physically touches the block. At the same time, when 
aspects of objects do contact and affect one another this can create a mutual weighing, 
in which affective communication takes place and thus an atmosphere is formed. While 
seemingly abstract, this account of atmospheres having a weight actually chimes with 
lived experience,  where  people  often refer  to  a  situation as  “heavy”  or  a  room as 
expressing a “light and airy feeling.” 
We can use the distinction between non-relational mass and relational weight, 
alongside our understanding of objects as selectively encountering one another,  to 
understand how atmospheres can be composed of a number of the same bodies and 
objects, while remaining mutually exterior from one another. For example, the affects 
the ladies in the sitting room generated through the specific sound and intonation of 
their voices extended and met the bodies of the other patients in the waiting room. 
Most  patients  were  affected  by  this,  which  caused  some  to  turn  and  join  the 
conversation and others to turn away. In this case the same affect had differential 
impacts on the bodies involved in the encounter. Some affects touched, communicated 
and  weighed  against  one  another  generating  an  atmosphere,  while  in  other  cases 
particular bodies or objects touched but did not communicate or missed one another, 
thus  remaining outside  of  the  atmosphere.  In  other  cases,  bodies  or  object  in  an 
environment  neither  touched  nor  communicated  at  all.  These  relations  of  touch, 
communication and non-touch, in turn generated different effects and thus another 
atmosphere. Crucially both atmospheres, of convivial  conversation as well  as polite 
frustration, were equally present, while remaining distinct, even when specific objects 
and bodies were contributing to both atmospheres at the same time. In the optometry 
ward,  the  weighing  and  thus  co-existence  of  these  two  atmospheres  in  turn 
emphasised  and  highlighted  the  distinction  and  difference  between  them  to  the 
patients who were waiting for treatment or diagnosis.
In terms of nonrepresentational methods, understanding how objects selectively 
encounter and weigh or fail to weigh against each other could be aided by the further 
development of what Shaw et al.  (2013) term a “standpoint ontology.” Referring to 
mosquitos, Shaw et al. understand standpoint ontology as seeing “lived experience as 
unavoidably partial and fragmented: as a very particular experience of being-in-the-
world” (p. 263). To occupy a mosquito’s standpoint they suggest it is necessary to 
“delve beneath the molar forms and discover a world of chemistry, ions and sparks: 
where environment and organism pulsate together” (p. 263).  Whereas Shaw et al.’s 
standpoint  ontology  assumes  perspective  is  limited  to  living  things,  developing  a 
standpoint ontology to study atmospheres would require the researcher to attempt to 
occupy the position of multiple entities, both living and non-living, to think through 
how an object or force encounters other things. 
A  nonrepresentational  approach  to  atmospheres’  coexistence  involves  a 
flattening  and  breaking  down  of  distinctions  between  living  and  dead  matter  to 
suggest  that  all  objects  have  the  potential  to  equally  impact  or  weigh  upon  an 
atmosphere.  Attending to the standpoint  of  various objects  does not  mean simply 
making a  list  of  an  object’s  properties.  Rather,  a  nonrepresentational  approach to 
atmospheres considers an object’s potential as well as actual modes of relation, which 
are in turn dependent on the other bodies and objects present in an atmosphere. In the 
example above, we could begin an investigation of an atmosphere from the standpoint 
of the exhaled air that forms the sigh of waiting patients such as its power, reach, 
volume, pitch and so on. Or we could begin with the light bulbs that shape the kind of 
illumination  that  the  waiting  room is  bathed in.  Following the  nonrepresentational 
conviction that “mimesis is impossible” (Vannini, this volume) attempting to occupy the 
standpoint of a light bulb  is not to pretend to understand what it is really like to be a 
light  bulb  or  a  breath  of  air.  Rather  it  is  to  focus  on  forms  of  exchange  and 
communication  which  often  exist  beneath  the  thresholds  of  humans’  conscious 
awareness, or indeed do not phenomenally appear to humans at all, in order to open 
up  and  question  the  limits  and  boundaries  that  shape  the  co-existence  of 
atmospheres. 
Causal Powers
It is the objects and bodies and the precise nature of the types of affective interaction 
that take place (or fail to take place) in a situation that determine the coexistence of 
atmospheres and their boundaries, limits and consistencies. And yet, atmospheres are 
irreducible phenomena: neither wholly separate from the relations that form them, nor 
wholly determined by those relations. Emphasising the irreducibility of atmospheres 
directs us to their strange, ambiguous causal powers. Consider another example of the 
emergency  waiting  room  and  the  ripple  of  surprise  occasioned  by  a  sudden  cry 
momentarily interrupting waiting. 
It’s around 2.40 am, the room is quiet. People appear in pain. Some are worried, 
others doze more or less quietly. Doctors come and go, people arrive and leave. Two 
parents  are  tired,  awake.  Our  daughter  sleeps nestled into  her  mother’s  shoulder. 
Suddenly, she cries out. It’s not a noise we’ve heard before. It startles and scares us. 
When will we get to see a doctor? Should we ask? The noise jolts other people, they 
turn to us, some stealing glances at our daughter. One man says quietly “poor thing.” 
Someone we presume is his partner nods.   
On the one hand, the atmosphere of the room conditions how waiting happens. 
An atmosphere appears to have a quasi-autonomous existence, shaping actions that 
are themselves part of how an atmosphere settles and shifts a little, but continues to 
stay  awhile.  Perhaps  lacking  the  sense  of  solidity  we  give  to  other  more  obvious 
material conditions, atmospheres condition by becoming part of how situations and 
events happen. On the other hand, atmospheres are conditioned by the ensemble of 
bits and pieces from which they emanate. We might make an open-ended list of the 
elements that condition without determining an atmosphere, itself an act that remind 
us of the (im)material heterogeneity of the “origins” for this or that atmosphere. Where 
an  “origin”  of  an  atmosphere  is  understood,  following  Bennett  (2010:  33),  as  “a 
complex,  mobile,  and  heteronomous  enjoiner  of  forces”  that  mediates  how  an 
atmosphere emanates:
... the logistics of emergency care and systems of prioritisation based on need
... sleeping children
... white walls, blood, sick 
... practices and expressions of sympathy 
... being with strangers
... a cry and the absence of cries. 
... waves of tiredness 
... the uncertain commonality of illness and pain 
How might we attune to an atmosphere as irreducible phenomenon: at once an 
effect of such an ensemble but also itself a causal power alongside others in situations 
or events? A version of this question has been at the heart of reflections on the term 
atmospheres.  The  phenomenologist  Mikel  Dufrenne  (1976)  stresses  that  an 
atmosphere as a “total effect” cannot be decomposed into a series of separate parts. 
Focusing on aesthetic atmospheres (1976, p. 327, italics in original), he stresses that 
“we cannot reduce to their elements the melancholy grace of Ravel’s Pavana pour une 
enfante défunte, the glory of Franck’s chorales, or the tender sensitivity of Debussy’s 
La fille aux cheveux de lin.” Whilst an atmosphere is composed from a set of elements, 
atmosphere as a singular affective quality exceeds them. There are parts of his account 
we disagree with, but Dufrenne’s emphasis on an atmosphere as a “total  effect” is 
interesting because it puts in question a methodology that would reduce any particular 
atmosphere to a secondary, lifeless, product of a network of relations that is given 
methodological primacy. How, then, to approach the causal powers of atmospheres?   
What  Harman  (2010)  calls  linear  billiard-ball  causation  may  be  useful  for 
thinking about some of the ways in which atmospheres emanate, but an attempt to 
separate out the assembling of atmospheres into effects and determinants is likely to 
fall  short  precisely  because  atmospheres  envelop,  they  infuse  and  mix  with  other 
elements. Let’s return to the scene from the emergency waiting room. How should we 
separate out cause and effect, or distinguish between that which conditions and that 
which is conditioned? Nevertheless, there may be occasions of what Delanda (2005), 
Connolly  (2005)  and  others  term “efficient  causality:”  where  an  atmospheric  effect 
follows  from a  determinant  and  that  effect  proceeds  in  a  linear  fashion  on  a  set 
trajectory. Methodologically, we need to be open to the possibility of such occasions in 
order  to  keep  open  the  question  of  what  atmospheres  do.  But  we  also  need  to 
experiment with other versions of causality that offer us alternative ways of attuning to 
what atmospheres do. 
Perhaps we could learn from William E.  Connolly’s  (2011) idea of  “emergent 
causality” when approaching what an atmosphere does. Connolly describes “emergent 
causality” as process whereby causes can become effects and vice-versa, which give a 
good sense of how something like an atmosphere is both an effect of a gathering of 
elements and a mediating force that actively changes the gathering it emanates from. 
The causal power of an atmosphere is only, however, revealed through those changes: 
Emergent causality is causal—rather than reducible to a mere web of definitional 
relations—in that a movement in one force-field helps to induce changes in 
others. But it is also emergent in that: first, some of the turbulence introduced 
into the second field is not always knowable in detail in itself before it arrives 
darkly  through  the  effects  that  emerge;  [and]  second,  the  new  forces  may 
become infused to  some degree into  the very  organisation of  the emergent 
phenomenon so that the causal factor is not entirely separate from the latter 
field (Connolly, 2011, p. 171).
Whilst not discussing atmospheres directly, what Connolly provokes us to think 
about is how an atmosphere is at once an effect that emanates from a gathering, and a 
cause that may itself have some degree of weight. An atmosphere is an “emergent 
cause”  because  we  cannot  be  sure  of  the  character  of  the  atmosphere  before 
registering its effects in what bodies do—an atmosphere is revealed precisely as it is 
expressed in bodily feelings, and qualified in emotions and other actions. In the above 
vignette, perhaps the atmosphere emerges in and is reflected in and is enacted by the 
acts of concern that range from a hug to a word of sympathy uttered and overheard. 
Perhaps the atmosphere becomes infused into those and other acts. As well as being 
ambiguous with regard to the absence/presence and subjective/objective distinctions, 
atmospheres are ambiguous with regard to the distinction between causes and effects. 
It is in this sense that atmospheres weigh on others ambiguously. They become one 
casually efficacious element amongst others, but in a way that is uncertain precisely 
because  of  their  ambiguous  status  as  surrounds  that  envelop  and  encircle. 
Atmospheres are perhaps better researched as affective propositions, unfinished lures 
to  feeling  a  situation,  site,  person or  thing in  a  particular  way  that  may  come to 
condition life. 
Transformation
Atmospheres  change—that  much  we  have  seen  in  the  examples  of  a  cry  in  an 
emergency  room,  or  the  to  and fro  of  conversation  in  the  optometry  department. 
However the issue is to understand exactly how and why an atmosphere may change, 
whilst  holding  onto  the  touch,  or  weight,  of  an  atmosphere.  Recognising  the  co-
existence  of  atmospheres  we  can  wager  that  extremely  infectious  or  dominant 
atmospheres,  such  as  mass  panic  or  terror  are  actually  quite  rare  phenomena, 
compared to the multiple minor atmospheres that constitute the banality of everyday 
experience. In this case it is important to differentiate between transformations that 
occur  through  interior  changes  within  an  atmosphere  as  distinct  from changes  in 
atmosphere that  occur  when one atmosphere encounters  another  and overrides or 
defuses its potency to affect. This kind of distinction is key to a nonrepresentational 
approach  to  atmospheres  because  it  allows  us  to  introduce  differentiations  that 
multiply,  rather  than  shut  down,  potential  ways  of  knowing  and  forms  of 
understanding  atmospheres.  In  turn  these  distinctions  help  bring  to  presence  a 
heightened awareness, in both the researcher and eventual reader of that research, 
regarding the complexity of atmospheric transformation. Returning to the example of 
waiting rooms,  the difference between internal  and external  transformation can be 
fleshed out through the following vignette. 
A woman emerged from a treatment room to a waiting area in an endoscopy 
ward. Previous to her exit the room had been calm, with patients reading magazines 
and watching the flat screen television that was attached to one wall. Exiting the door 
the woman looked visibly upset. A catheter tube emerged from one nostril and was 
bent backwards towards her ear and disappeared under the neck of her t-shirt, taped 
in place with medical sticking plasters. A partner, friend or relative of the woman who 
had been sitting in the waiting room quickly stood up and approached the woman as if 
to comfort her.  The woman turned away and left  the room, leaving the relative to 
gather  their  belongings  and  hastily  follow  her.  This  event,  only  a  few  seconds  in 
duration, palpably altered the atmosphere in the waiting room. The previous sense of 
calm was interrupted and replaced with a sense of unease and disquiet. Other patients, 
who previously had been watching television or reading a magazine had noted the 
woman’s hasty exit from the waiting area and the addition of the catheter tube that 
had not been present when she had entered the treatment room. This event perhaps 
began to stir  the imagination of  others  who may have been present  for  the same 
procedure,  inciting  feelings  of  fear  or  apprehension.  This  palpable  change  in 
atmosphere  was  brought  about  by  both  an  internal  change  in  the  atmosphere 
emanating from the woman, which in turn clashed with the existing atmosphere and 
worked to override it, shaping the atmosphere of the room even after she had left. 
Examining the scene again in more detail, the internal change in the atmosphere 
that the woman emanated may have been brought about by the treatment she had 
undergone,  but  also  the  medical  apparatus  that  she  was  augmented  with.  Her 
disposition and mood had clearly changed, but it was not simply the addition of these 
objects to the situation that had altered the atmosphere. Rather, it was the specific 
arrangement and configuration of these objects on the woman’s body. The intrusion of 
a catheter tube into her nostril seemed to produce an uncomfortable and unfamiliar set 
of sensations which was echoed by the look on her face and body language. Regardless 
of  her  personal  subjective  experience  of  the  catheter  and  prior  treatment,  the 
catheter’s capacity to affect was both internally experienced as well as publically felt by 
others in the waiting room. Here the catheter ignited a kind of synesthetic recognition 
in  one  of  the  authors,  who began to  imagine  the  sensation  of  the  catheter,  even 
though he had never personally experienced the sensation of wearing one himself. 
Indeed, this example shows that the affects a person may experience in a situation do 
not have to be accurately communicated or transported to another person in order to 
generate a coherent or powerful atmosphere. What matters is the force of transmission 
itself, how many bodies an object affects and in what way. In this case, the woman 
leaving the room had created an atmosphere through the assemblage of entities that 
were very localised to her own body, but still had a powerful, transmittable affect. 
As we argued earlier, atmospheres regularly co-exist in the same environment 
without  encountering  or  affecting  one  another.  However,  in  the  above  case  the 
existence  of  one  atmosphere  and  the  introduction  of  another  caused  the  new 
atmosphere to become the dominant one. Here, the affects present in one atmosphere 
meet  affects  in  the  new  atmosphere.  Rather  than  passing  these  affects  without 
influence,  these affects do communicate and begin to take on their  own intensity, 
which in turn alters the boundaries between the atmospheres. If the communication 
between atmospheres continues, this can lead to the situation (as described above) in 
which the power of the  existing atmosphere’s capacity to affect has diminished to the 
point at which it is no longer accessible to the objects or bodies in that situation. From 
the position of the bodies and objects in that environment this means that the existing 
atmosphere no longer has the capacity to affect and so, for all intents and purposes, 
appears to become subsumed by the new atmosphere.  
Methodologically this means that atmospheric change can be understood as a 
matter of affects meeting one another in ways that produce (or fail to produce) new 
relations between the entities within that atmosphere. Rather than using a quantitative 
vocabulary based around the addition or subtraction of elements to an atmosphere to 
understand change, it may be better to use a qualitative vocabulary of thresholds and 
tipping points. These two terms can be elaborated by returning to the concepts of 
weight and mass developed in section three. Each object and body in an environment 
has a mass, which weighs upon one another and brings an atmosphere into existence. 
An atmosphere’s threshold for internal change is therefore shaped by the presence and 
distribution of the mass of objects and bodies, because it is the mass of objects and 
bodies  and their  configuration that  determines an atmosphere’s  capacity  to  affect. 
Altering the position of  a  body or  changing some condition within an atmosphere 
changes its capacity to affect and can potentially overcome a threshold that maintained 
the  global  or  prevailing  affect  the  atmosphere  was  generating.  For  example,  the 
placement of a catheter upon a body has the potential to totally alter the comportment 
and behaviour  of  that  body.  The calmness that  initially  characterised the woman’s 
demeanour in the endoscopy ward was replaced by irritation, frustration and seeming 
self-consciousness.  Here  the  catheter  and its  particular  placement  in  the  woman’s 
nose  and throat  introduced new,  seemingly  negative  affects,  breaking through the 
previous threshold that constituted her confident atmosphere to produce a new more 
intense, negative atmosphere in its place. 
In  a  similar  way  we  could  state  that  it  is  the  mutual  weighing  between 
atmospheres when they selectively encounter one another, which both separates them 
out and holds them in tension, which shapes an atmosphere’s tipping point. Here a 
tipping point is understood to be the point at which an atmosphere stops emanating 
its  particular  affects  because it  is  overridden or  subsumed by another  atmosphere 
external to it. In the case of the newly augmented woman in the waiting area of the 
endoscopy unit, an atmosphere was introduced to the situation, and momentarily co-
existed with the existing atmosphere. But as people became aware of, and responded 
to, the negative affects emanating from the women, the new atmosphere began to 
override the existing one, until it became dominant. Suffice to say, an atmosphere’s 
tipping point is not absolute or fixed, but relative to the objects that compose the 
existing atmosphere, as well as the arrangement of objects and intensities of affect in 
the  new  atmosphere.  Formally  put,  we  could  say  that  mass  determines  an 
atmosphere’s  threshold at  which it  undergoes internal  change,  while  the relational 
weighing between atmospheres determine their tipping point, or the point at which an 
atmosphere  is  subsumed  or  overridden  by  the  external  change  brought  about  by 
another  atmosphere.  In  other  words,  atmospheres  take  on  particular  phenomenal 
appearances to the entities within that atmosphere as affects meet or fail to meet one 
another and build or fail to build intensity. The production (or lack thereof) of intensity 
in turn creates the phenomenal appearance of an atmospheric change happening or 
not happening, depending on the objects and bodies involved in an encounter. 
Returning  to  the  problematic  of  nonrepresentational  methods,  attending  to 
these multiple forms of transformation is not about fixing each atmosphere through a 
particular set of naming practices. Rather than identifying various forms of internal and 
external  change as a way of exhaustively describing an atmosphere,  we can use a 
qualitative vocabulary of tipping points and thresholds to focus on an atmospheres 
ambiguous nature by attending to its continuing differentiation as objects weigh and 
fail to weigh against one another. Representing atmospheres in language and words is 
a matter of following these processes of differentiation and change in order to answer 
a specific research question, while recognising that these processes of differentiation 
are always subject to another differentiation or another form of exposure that emerges 
when the researcher attempts to occupy an alternative standpoint or perspective.
Conclusion 
The chapter has worked with a double account of non-representational methods. First, 
non-representational  methods  concern  objects  of  inquiry  that  are,  under  some 
description, non-representational. For us, atmospheres exemplify such an object of 
inquiry. In their vagueness, in their ambiguity, in their indeterminacy, in their weight, 
atmospheres  might  be  seen  as  not  simply  the  paradigmatic  non-representational 
object,  but  also  a  matter  of  concern  that  heightens  the  challenges  the  non-
representational  supposedly  poses  to  social  scientific  habits  and  practices  of 
description  and  explanation.  This  does  not  mean  that  atmospheres  are  somehow 
separate from representational forms and devices. Far from it. But it does mean that 
atmospheres  cannot  be  treated  through  an  exclusive  emphasis  on  a  system  of 
signification and it  does mean that the strange reality of atmospheres poses some 
problems for social analysis. 
Which leads us to the second sense of non-representational methods we have 
worked with, albeit more implicitly than the first. Non-representational methods do 
not refer to a separate set of methods neatly distinguished from methods that are now 
supposedly deficient. Instead, we take non-representational methods to name a set of 
ways  of  approaching a  phenomenon,  of  relating or  not  to  the  weight  or  touch of 
something, which intensify the problems that the object of inquiry poses for social 
analysis.  We  could  say,  then,  that  a  non-representational  method  involves  an 
intensification of problems and requires staying with those problems for a while. 
In this spirit, what we have tried to do in this chapter is intensify the problems 
that emerge once atmospheres become a matter of concern in the social  sciences. 
Problematics  that  we  see  as  shared  between  atmosphere  and  other  non-
representational  conditions  and  concerns.  Problematics  that  all  concern  how  to 
explicate the background of life and thought without presuming that the background 
is  simply  an  inert  “context”  or  that  the  background  is  a  mysterious,  inaccessible, 
substance outside of all mediation. 
Indeed,  by  answering  the  five  questions  raised  in  the  introduction  we  have 
developed a methodology to study how atmospheres operate in practice. To conclude 
then,  we  can  return  to  these  questions  to  summarise  what  an  atmospheric 
methodology might do and how the case of atmospheres opens up wider questions 
about nonrepresentational methods. 
Firstly,  how  to  identify  an  atmosphere  and  what  role  does  naming  play  in 
rendering atmospheres sensible through recognition and identification? Here we touch 
on problems of misrecognition, but also of naming as a pragmatic act that, rather than 
being  bestowed  with  a  power  to  stifle  life,  is  one  way  in  which  atmospheres  are 
rendered  present.  Naming  is  ambivalent  though.  Both  evocative  and  referential, 
naming speaks to the necessity of treating atmospheres as conditioned conditions that 
are at once singular—this atmosphere here, now—and held in common—atmospheres 
that repeat with variations across sites, networks or events.  
Secondly, we have argued that atmospheres are both ontologically and spatially 
discrete  from  one  another,  but  they  can  also  co-exist  within  the  same  space  or 
environment  without  necessarily  affecting  one  another.  This  is  an  important  point 
because  it  complicates  a  narrative  in  which  a  space  or  system produces  a  single 
overarching atmosphere. To account for how multiple atmospheres can exist alongside 
one another requires we attempt to occupy multiple standpoints to consider how a 
body or object may be contributing to different but contemporaneous atmospheres. In 
turn  this  encourages  us  to  take  the  non-human as  seriously  as  the  human when 
evoking  an  atmosphere.  Regarding  non-representational  methods,  this  means 
developing a standpoint ontology to emphasise the excessive and not quite graspable 
nature of atmospheres. Indeed, investigating an atmosphere from the perspective of a 
catheter tube or health poster can itself conjure a sense of strangeness or unfamiliarity 
in a reader. As Vannini suggests in the introduction to this volume, generating a sense 
of wonder through the ways phenomena are accounted for is something like an ethos 
shared  across  non-representational  theories.  As  such,  these  standpoints  do  not 
attempt to occupy an impossible position—the reality of existence for a catheter tube 
or health poster—but they do allow us to avoid an impulse to begin and end accounts 
of atmosphere with the human. By holding the question of what exactly constitutes an 
atmosphere open, a gap is created in which a broader range of non-human things can 
occupy a researchers concern, at least for a while. 
Thirdly,  how  might  we  build  the  irreducibility  of  atmospheres  into  our 
methodological  practices?  Atmospheres  are  conditioned  by  relations,  but  neither 
reducible to them nor completely separate from them. This means experimenting in 
analysis  with  ways  of  approaching  the  causal  powers  of  atmospheres:  how 
atmospheres  envelop  and  surround,  infusing  practices  and  becoming  part  of  the 
background of sites. To name an atmosphere, to return to our first point, is to evoke 
their casual role. But to do so requires that we work with complex versions of causality, 
including  ideas  of  emergent  causality,  that  are  attuned  to  in-distinctions  between 
causes and effects and are able to hold onto how an affective condition takes place.   
Fourthly,  we  have  argued  that  changes  in  atmospheres  take  place  via  two 
processes:  an  atmosphere  can  change  via  the  differentiation  of  objects  or  affects 
internal to an atmosphere and an atmosphere can also change when it meets another 
atmosphere that overrides or alters it capacity to affect in a fundamental way. In this 
regard changes in atmosphere can be gradual, as entities that constitute it are change 
or are taken or added to that atmosphere, or change can be sudden, such as when one 
very  potent  atmosphere meets  another  and overrides it,  cancelling the less  potent 
atmospheres  capacity  to  affect.  Studying  atmospheric  change  then,  requires 
researchers  to  become  sensitised  to  differences  between  internal  and  external 
atmospheric shifts. On one hand, this involves identifying all the entities in a situation 
and what parts or aspects of these entities are interacting or relating to other entities 
in  ways  that  amplify  or  reinforce  an  existing  atmosphere.  On the  other  hand this 
involves  recognising  when  a  new  set  of  affects  emerge  from  outside  the  current 
atmosphere. Becoming sensitive to an atmosphere’s weight and touch does not mean 
throwing away of discarding pre-existing research methods. Rather it is a matter of 
style, a way of recording, analysing and writing that stays with the multiplicity of things 
that  form  an  atmosphere  and  shape  its  capacity  to  change,  instead  of  trying  to 
immediately name an object or body as the central cause of affective transformation. 
Objects and bodies are not then to be analysed from one perspective, but several. The 
catheter does not have one single affect, but a catheter-nose affect, a catheter-face 
affect, a catheter stranger affect and so on. 
Finally  then,  we  hope  that  the  concepts  and  strategies  developed  here  will  help 
sensitise researchers to the complexities of atmosphere and in doing so expand and 
inform  future  nonrepresentational  work  on  this  ephemeral,  yet  constitutive, 
phenomenon.    
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